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United States v. Toscanino-The forcible abduction of a crim-
inal defendant from a foreign state precludes a federal court's
acceptance of jurisdiction.*
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
was called upon, in United States v. Toscanino,l to decide
"whether a federal court must assume jurisdiction over a defen-
dant who is illegally apprehended abroad and forcibly abducted
by government agents to the United States for the purpose of
facing criminal charges. ' 2 Resting its decision on what it per-
ceived to be violations of the United States Constitution and
treaties in force between the United States and Uruguay, the
court held that jurisdiction could not be assumed.
Francisco Toscanino, a citizen of Italy residing in Uruguay,
was convicted of conspiring to import and distribute narcotics
into the United States.3 Appellant asserted prior to and didring
trial that the district court lacked jurisdiction becauise of the
manner in which he was arrested. In an offered proof of facts,
Toscanino alleged that he had been forcibly kidnapped from his
home in Uruguay, taken to Brazil by agents in the employ of the
United States, isolated and subjected to torture for seventeen
days4 and then enplaned for the United States where he was
placed under arrest.5
*Eight months after its decision in United States v. Toscanino, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was given the opportunity, in United States ex
rel. Lujan v. Gengler, of reassessing its holding. The import and effect of Lujan are noted
by the author in a discussion immediately following the original comment.
1. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), petition for rehearing en banc denied, 43 U.S.L.W.
4175 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1974).
2. 500 F.2d at 271.
3. Toscanino was found guilty of violating former 21 U.S.C. §§ 173, 174 (1964) (re.
pealed in 1970).
4. Appellant offered to prove that he was
denied. . . sleep and all forms of nourishment for days at a time. Nourishment
was provided intravenously in a manner precisely equal to an amount necessary
to keep him alive. . . .Toscaniso was forced to walk . . . a hallway for seven
or eight hours at a time. When he could no longer stand he was kicked and
beaten but all in a manner contrived to punish without scarring. . . .his fingers
were pinched with metal pliers. Alcohol was flushed into his eyes and nose and
other fluids. . . were forced up his anal passage. Incredibly, these agents of the
United States government attached electrodes to Toscanino's earlobes, toes, and
genitals. Jarring jolts of electricity were shot throughout his body, rendering him
unconscious for indeterminate periods of time but again leaving no physical
scars.
500 F.2d at 270.
5. Toscanino also asserted on trial and on appeal that the district court improperly
denied his motion to compel the United States Attorney to state, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
section 3504 (1970), whether electronic surveillance had taken place. Toscanino alleged
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The United States Attorney neither affirmed nor denied
these allegations, contending that the proceedings were indepen-
dent of the allegations' validity. The district court, relying princi-
pally on Ker v. Illinois' and Frisbie v. Collins,7 agreed. Ruling
that the manner by which a party is brought before the court is
immaterial to its power to proceed, the court refused to dismiss
the indictment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
unanimously reversed. Holding that courts must divest them-
selves of jurisdiction in a criminal case when the defendant has
been forcibly kidnapped from a foreign state, the court remanded
Toscanino for an evidentiary hearing with respect to appellant's
allegations.' The court concluded that because the abduction vio-
lated American treaty commitments and the United States Con-
stitution, the acceptance of jurisdiction would be improper
The court, in determining that treaty violations had oc-
curred, examined sections of the United Nations Charter and the
Charter of the Organization of American States. 0 The court con-
in his proof of facts that he had been the target of a telephone wiretap while residing in
Uruguay. 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1970) provides in relevant part:
(a) In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court. . . of the
United States
(1) upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissable
because it is the primary product of an unlawful act or because it was
obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act, the opponent of the claim
shall affirm or deny the occurrence of the unlawful act;
(b) As used in this section 'unlawful act' means any act the use of any elec-
tronic, mechanical, or other device (as defined in section 2510(5) of this title)
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or any regulation
or standard promulgated pursuant thereto.
6. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Ker, while residing in Peru, was indicted in Illinois for larceny
and embezzlement. The President, upon request by the Governor of Illinois, invoked the
treaty of extradition between Peru and the United States, and issued a warrant authoriz-
ing an American agent to take custody of Ker from the Peruvian authorities. The warrant
was never served however, instead Ker was forcibly abducted by the agent and brought
to Illinois where he was tried and convicted.
7. 342 U.S. 519 (1952). In Frisbee, Collins sought release through a writ of habeas
corpus from a Michigan state prison. He alleged that, "while he was living in Chicago,
Michigan officers forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked and took him to Michigan." Id.
at 520.
8. 500 F.2d at 281.
9. Additionally, the court held that appellant could properly assert a claim under 18
U.S.C. section 3504 (1970) even though the alleged surveillance took place in Uruguay.
See note 49 infra.
10. The court relied upon U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4, which states:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
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strued these charter provisions as an agreement by the United
States "not to seize persons residing within the territorial limits
of Uruguay. . . ."" This construction was essential to the court's
disposition of the case.
The court recognized that two lines of authority, embodied
in Cook v. United States"z and Ker v. Illinois,'3 had possible
application to the instant case. The distinguishing factor in these
decisions was the violation of a self-executing treaty by an extra-
territorial seizure. 4 The Supreme Court in Cook held that the
existence of a treaty and its subsequent violation precluded the
acceptance of jurisdiction. 5 In Ker, however, the Court held that
the absence of a treaty permitted the acceptance of jurisdiction
and an adjudication on the merits.'6 The interpretation of the
charters by the court in Toscanino established that a violation
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
The court also relied upon Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American
States, which declares:
The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily,
of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state,
directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or
special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall
be recognized.
11. 500 F.2d at 278.
12. 288 U.S. 102 (1933). Accord, United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 1927);
United States v. Schouweiler, 19 F.2d 387 (S.D. Cal. 1927). See also United States v.
Cotton, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973).
13. 119 U.S. at 436. Accord, Arch v. United States, The Island Home, 13 F.2d 382
(5th Cir. 1926); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1934); The Muriel E.
Winters, 6 F.2d 466 (S.D. Texas 1925); United States v. Unverzagt, 299 F. 1015 (W.D.
Wash. 1924); The Grace and Ruby, 283 F. 475 (D. Mass. 1922). See also United States v.
Cotton, 471 F.2d at 744; United States v. Caramian, 468 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Vicars, 467 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 967 (1973); Bacon v.
United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971); Virgin Islands v. Ortiz, 427 F.2d 1043 (3rd
Cir. 1970); Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1964); United States v. Sobeli, 244
F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957).
14. A self-executing treaty has been defined as one "which prescribes by its own
terms a rule for the executive or for the courts or which creates obligations for individuals
enforceable without legislation." Evans, Self-Executing Treaties In The United States of
America, 30 BR. YBK. INT'L L. 178, 185 (1953).
15. In Cook a British vessel suspected of smuggling was seized by the United States
Coast Guard. This act violated a treaty in force between the United States and Great
Britain which specifically established territorial limits, extending out to sea, beyond
which seizures could not be undertaken by the United States. In affirming that the libel
for forfeiture was properly dismissed, the Supreme Court recognized that the treaty com-
pelled such a holding. As the Court concluded, the treaty was meant to deal completely
with the subject of search and seizure and its violation deprived the court of jurisdiction
to decide the issue. 288 U.S. at 112.
16. 119 U.S. at 443-44.
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had occurred and that Toscanino was consequently governed by
Cook.
Two issues, however, call into question the court's conclu-
sions. It is by no means clear that the court's interpretation of the
charters was correct and that a violation had occurred. Further-
more, had a breach of the compacts been determined it is simi-
larly unclear whether Toscanino, as an individual, was in a legal
position to gain advantage from it.
The charter provisions construed by the court deal with the
duty of member states to refrain from the use or threat of force
against the territorial inviolability of another state. The court
interpreted these sections as forbidding the forcible kidnapping
of an alleged criminal from within the territory of a member state.
However, an analysis of the provisions indicates that they were
intended to bear upon a different aspect of international relation-
ships. Contrary to the interpretation of the court, the sections'
purpose was to prohibit aggression and intervention in the classic
and commonly understood sense.
The United Nations Charter provision
is to be compared with the corresponding provisions of the
League of Nations Covenant, notably Article 10 by which
members undertook "to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political inde-
pendence of all Members of the League" and Article 12, 13 and
15 by which members undertook not to "resort to war" under
certain conditions.' 7
Similarly, this provision has been characterized as a restatement
of the traditional non-intervention rule, 8 commonly understood
as prohibiting "an act of dictation by one state to another with
regard to its internal or external policy backed by the use or
threat of force."' 9
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals,20 the foundation of the
17. L. GOODRICH & E. HAmBRo, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 103 (2d ed. 1949)
(emphasis added).
18. J. HALDERMAN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 50 (1966). See also F.
DE LiMA, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (1971); J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD
ORDER 92 (1958); Frank, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use
Of Force By States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970); Verosta, The Maintenance of Interna-
tional Security As A Specific Purpose of the United Nations, 1971 U. ToLEDo L. REV. 127.
19. Brierly speaking before the International Law Commission, International Law
Commission, 1st Sess. 12th meeting, Apr. 28, 1949, A/CN.4/SR, 12, Apr. 29, 1949, p. 2,
quoted in 5 WHrrEmAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 329 (1965).
20. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, 9 October 1944, Chapter II Principles (4). See
L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, supra note 17, at 103.
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United Nations Charter, omitted the concluding words of the
present paragraph. The Proposals, which stated that "[a]ll
members shall refrain from the threat or use of force in any man-
ner inconsistent with the proper purposes of the organization"
indicates that the section was designed simply to prohibit aggres-
sion.2' The circumstances in which the provision has been invoked
by the United Nations buttress this construction.22
The Second Circuit's citation of the Eichmann case as
United Nations action supportive of its interpretation is incor-
rect.23 The record indicates that no reliance was placed upon any
specific Charter provision by Argentina, nor subsequently by the
Security Council, in their condemnation of Israel's actions. It is
questionable whether the parties even viewed the controversy as
being a legal issue. In an Explanatory Memorandum which ac-
companied its request for a Security Council meeting, the Argen-
tinian government stated that
[i]n these circumstances the only remaining recourse is to the
Security Council. A political question is involved which ...
contributes a precedent dangerous for international peace and
security, for the maintenance of which the Security Council
bears primary responsibility.4
It seems, therefore, that the United Nations Charter section re-
lied upon by the court does not yield to the interpretation given.
21. The section's concluding words are ". . . against the territory or political inde-
pendence of another state." In their treatise, Goodrich and Hambro indicate that it was
the insistance of certain smaller states that brought about the expanded provision. These
states' purpose was to explicitly establish "that there should be included in the Charter
some more specific guarantee that force could not be used by more powerful states." See
L. GoODRICH & E. HAMBRO, supra note 17, at 103.
22. Thus, when Ambassador Stevenson addressed the Security Council during its
debate on India's invasion of Goa, he stated that, "what is at stake. . . is a bold violation
of the most basic principle in the United Nations Charter, stated in . . . Article 2, para-
graph 4. . . ." SCORXVIMtg. 987 pp. 7-27. See also the statement of Ambassador Lodge
concerning the dispatch of an observation group to Lebanon, Discussion in the Security
Council, 15-18 July 1958, SCOR XIII Mtgs. 827, 832-3.
23. 500 F.2d at 277.
24. 5 WHnrmm, supra note 19, at 211 (emphasis added). In bringing a case before
the Security Council, it is arguably a recognition by the party that the issue is politically
rather than legally based. Roslyn Higgins observed that
[miany lawyers contend that law plays a minimal role in the work of the
Council. That organ is, they point out, essentially a political body. It operates
in a different way from a judicial body such as the International Court of Jus-
tice, and frequently ipnores the law of nations.
Higgins, The Place of Inteinational Law In The Settlement of Disputes By The Security
Council, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1970).
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Furthermore, an investigation of the non-intervention article of
the Charter of the Organization of American States establishes a
similar conclusion. Article 17 of the Charter was designed to com-
bat the repeated United States military interventions into Latin
America which occurred in the early part of the century.n Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt's proclamation of 1904, announcing the
intention of the United States to exercise international police
power, provided the impetus in the Latin American states' drive
to establish the forbearer of the present treaty provision.26
The court's reliance upon treaty violations, as a basis for
precluding the acceptance of jurisdiction, was misplaced for an
additional reason. The Supreme Court has recognized that not
every breach of a treaty confers individual rights adjudicable in
court.
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations.
It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interests
and the honor of the government which are the parties to it. If
these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international
negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party
chooses to seek redress. . . . It is obvious that with all this the
judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress. But
a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights
upon the citizens. . . of one of the nations. . . which partake
of the nature of the municipal law, and which are capable of
enforcement as between private parties in the country ...
The Constitution of the United States places such provisions as
these in the same category as other laws of Congress. . . . A
treaty, then is a law of the land . . . whenever its provisions
prescribe a rule by which the rights of private citizens. . . may
be determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be
enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for
a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute.
The Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States were intended to be compacts among
independent states.n The treaties confer no rights upon the citi-
25. M. BALL, THE O.A.S. IN TRANSMON 48-57 (1969).
26. C. FENWICK, THE ORGANIZATION OF AhmcAN STATES 137-43 (1964).
27. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). See also United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407 (1886); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
28. Several courts have reached this conclusion. See Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F.
Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Sei Fujii v. State of Califor-
nia, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). See also Hitai v. United States Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Vargas, 370 F. Supp.
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zens of the contracting states.29 This conclusion is supported by
both municipal " and international law.3' Whether one concludes
that the treaties were not violated, or if violated accorded no
rights to Toscanino cognizable by our courts, United States v.
Toscanino apparently should have been decided in accordance
with those seizure cases, such as Ker, in which the courts' juris-
diction was unimpaired by treaty considerations.
The second principal basis for the denial of jurisdiction was
rooted in the court's determination that the abduction violated
the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment. 2 In concluding
that due process prohibited the acquisition of jurisdiction, the
court re-examined the traditional rule, expressed in Frisbie, that
due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is con-
victed of the charges against him after a fair trial in accordance
with constitutional procedural safeguards.3
The court, in so doing, broadly concluded that Frisbie was in
conflict with the expanded and enlightened interpretation of due
process expressed in more recent decisions of the Supreme Court
and therefore would be forced to yield. The "Ker-Frisbie rule,"
stated the court of appeals, "cannot be reconciled with the...
908 (D.P.R. 1974); Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Furthermore
[i]n the cases of Shelley v. Kraemer, [334 U.S. 1 (1948),] Sipes v. McGhee,
[316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947),] and Kempt v. Kempt [sic] [188 Misc.
310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1947),] counsel sought to show that restrictive
land covenants based upon race or color violated the human rights provisions
of the United Nations Charter. In each case, however, the court either refused
to pass upon the question or expressly rejected the contention that such restric-
tive covenant clauses could be successfully attacked in a court of law by virtue
of the legal effect of the United Nations Charter on the United States munici-
pal law.
Note, Constitutional Law-Treaties-Effect Of The United Nations Charter Upon In-
consistent State Law, 5 VILL. L. REV. 100, 103-04 (1959) (footnotes omitted). But see
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 673 (1947) (Murphy, J., concurring).
29. See notes 30 & 31 infra.
30. See note 13 infra. See also The Merino, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391 (1824); The
Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D.
Ill. 1934); United States v. Unverzagt, 299 F. 1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924).
31. See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction), [1924] P.C.I.J.,
ser. A, No. 2; 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 119 (1965); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw § 13, at 19 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1958). American practice similarly appears
to recognize that the state is the proper juridical personality to advance claims concerning
international kidnappings. See The Vincenti Affair, 1 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 624 (1920); The Cantu Case, 2 id. at 310; The Case of Blatt and Converse, 2
id. at 309.
32. 500 F.2d at 275.
33. 342 U.S. at 522.
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expansion of the concept of due process, which. . . protects...
against pretrial illegality by denying the government the fruits
• . . of any deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness. . . ."I' This
holding, extending the protections of the Constitution to an alien
residing in a foreign country, has important ramifications in
municipal and international law. Surprisingly, however, it was
not until reaching Toscanino's allegations of a government spon-
sored wiretap, employed against him in Uruguay, that the court
addressed itself to the issue."
The court noted that over the past century the protections
of the Constitution have been expanded to encompass citizens
outside,36 and aliens within" the territorial boundaries of the
United States. Concluding that "[n]o sound basis is offered in
support of a different rule with respect to aliens abroad," the
court held that the Constitution shielded Toscanino from viola-
tions of the fifth amendment. 8
The court's analysis both oversimplifies a recurring prob-
lem39 and ignores several sound bases which militate against such
an extension of constitutional protections. The court failed to
consider that the jurisdictional foundations which were present in
earlier decisions, in which the Constitution was extended, do not
necessarily exist to permit application of constitutional safe-
guards to an alien outside the territorial bounds of the United
34. 500 F.2d at 275. The decisions cited and discussed by the court as embodying the
expanded protections of the Due Process Clause were, United States v. Russel, 411 U.S.
423 (1973); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
35. 500 F.2d at 280. The constitutional issue was reached by the court when it held
that 18 U.S.C. section 3504 (1970) was intended to prohibit any act of surveillance deter-
mined to be in violation of the Constitution, and not simply those enumerated in the
statute.
36. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922);
Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951).
37. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590 (1953); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); San Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell,
457 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1972); Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); Cermeno-Cerna v.
Farrell, 291 F. Supp. 521 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
38. 500 F.2d at 280.
39. The issue was popularly expressed in the question, "does the Constitution follow
the flag?" For a discussion of this problem, see Flynn, The Constitution Abroad: The
Operation of The Constitution Beyond The Continental Limits of The United States, 32
TExAs L. REv. 58 (1953); cf. Sutherland, The Flag, The Constitution and International
Agreements, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1374 (1955), Fairman, Some New Problems of The Constitu-
tion Following The Flag, 1 STAN. L. REv. 587 (1949).
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States." In failing to recognize the absence of a jurisdictional base
for its holding, the court acted contrary to the holdings of Ameri-
can decisional4 and international law.
International law recognizes that a sovereign nation can exer-
cise its jurisdiction when a proper foundation exists.42 These un-
derpinnings are territoriality, nationality, protection of certain
state interests, and the protections of certain universal interests.43
Our courts, traditionally, have adhered to the limitations im-
posed by international law.4" Toscanino fails to meet the requi-
sites for establishing jurisdiction.
Practical difficulties also exist in extending the Constitu-
tion's protections to an alien residing abroad. Judge Anderson in
40. Since citizenship is not a consideration, ascertaining whether a territorial basis
existed for extending the Constitution should have been the goal of the court. Tradition-
ally, our courts have interpreted territoriality as a dual concept. Not only must the indi-
vidual be before the court, but the alleged injustice must have been committed within
the territorial ambit of the United States. See cases cited note 37 supra. (An exception is
recognized, apparently, when the non-resident alien owns property within the United
States and seeks the protections of the fifth amendment's just compensation clause. See,
e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States,
282 U.S. 481 (1931); Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966)).
Since appellant's complaint relies upon acts taking place in Uruguay, it would appear
that the court should have denied him the protections of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1950); Reyes v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 476 F.2d 910
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Cermeno-Cerna v. Farrell, 291 F. Supp. 521 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Pauling
v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390 (D. Cal. 1958), aff'd, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1960); cf.
Kakatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
The decisions denying the Constitution's protections to non-resident aliens do differ
in one material respect from Toscanino. Toscanino is a criminal case, and the appellant's
presence is not voluntary. The court was confronted with a different issue than the courts
in the earlier cases. The court apparently recognized this distinction when it questioned
whether the protections accorded an alien should not be commensurate with those of any
other defendant "at least where the government seeks to exploit the fruits of its unlawful
conduct in a criminal proceeding against the alien in the United States." 500 F.2d at 280.
However, if the court did view this as the issue before it, it was incumbent upon it to
so state the question in this narrower manner, and then fully explore its holding in the
light of the several factors noted above. See text accompanying notes 39-48 infra.
41. See note 40 supra.
42. See The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A No. 10 at 18. Rhyne noted that
[t]he jurisdictional competence of a state is the legal authority it possesses
consistent with the limitations of international law. . . . the jurisdiction of a
state typically includes authority over its land area, over bodies of water within
and adjoining its land area, over the airspace above it and over persons within
its domain.
C. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 102 (1971). See also 1 D. O'CONNELL supra note 31, at 655.
60; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § § 10-36 (1965).
43. See note 42 supra.
44. See note 40 supra.
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his concurring opinion touched on this problem. In disassociating
himself from the majority's application of the fourth amendment
to circumscribe illegal wiretapping abroad, Judge Anderson ques-
tioned the novel and unreasonable demands upon law enforce-
ment and national security agents such a holding entailed."
Agents complying with the laws of the country in which they were
located might concurrently find themselves in violation of the
United States Constitution.
The court's very method of reaching its holding gives pause,
especially the limited analysis given the issues. Extensions of the
Constitution should be cautiously undertaken.46 The Supreme
Court's admonition in In re Ross that "[t]he Constitution can
have no operation in another country" was a viable doctrine only
a short time ago.4" The Court, in circumstances more compelling
than Toscanino, did not utilize territoriality as a jurisdictional
foundation for extending constitutional rights to aliens. In the
Insular Cases, the residents of areas under the complete sover-
eignty and control of the United States were found not to be
entitled to full constitutional safeguards."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
failed in United States v. Toscanino to adequately explore the
bases upon which it chose to establish its holdings. In concluding
that the abduction of Toscanino violated American treaty obliga-
tions and the United States Constitution, the court relied upon
surface investigations of the issues.49
45. 500 F.2d at 281.
46. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 43, at 62 (discussion of the difficulties the Supreme
Court encountered with the famous Insular Cases).
47. 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). It was only with the Court's holding in Reid v. Covert
that Ross' holding was vitiated. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). It is noteworthy that even today a
citizen cannot always claim the Constitution's protection when outside the United States.
As Henkin noted when commenting on the vitality of Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341
(1952):
When the United States exercises authority as an occupying power, the Presi-
dent, as Commander in Chief, may establish courts for the trial of crimes com-
mitted there, and even American citizens may be tried in such courts without
jury trial or other safeguards provided in the Bill of Rights.
L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrruTioN 267 (1972).
48. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197
(1903); cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
49. After concluding its inquiry into Toscanino's allegations of forcible abduction, the
court addressed itself to the wiretap issue. Under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. section 3504
(1970), the government can be called upon to either affirm or deny that "evidence is
admissible because it was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act." An unlawful
act is defined in the statute as, "any act the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
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In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,'° the court of ap-
peals was afforded the opportunity of reviewing Toscanino. The
issue again before the court was the effect upon jurisdiction of a
forcible abduction occurring in a foreign state.
Lujan argued that the district court's dismissal of his peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus was in error under the Second
Circuit's holding in Toscanino. In support of his position, Lujan,
as had Toscanino, recounted the manner in which he was ar-
rested.5' The court, in apparent retreat from its broad holding in
Toscanino, affirmed the district court's ruling. The appellant's
pleadings, when measured against Toscanino, were found insuffi-
cient to afford relief. Emphasizing differences in the pleadings,
the court limited the sweep of Toscanino, determining that
Lujan's kidnapping breached neither American treaty commit-
ments nor the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment.
In Toscanino, the court had interpreted sections of the
United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of
American States as indicating an agreement by the United States
device (as defined in section 2510(5) of this title) in violation of the Constitution or law
of the United States . .. ."
The government argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that 18 U.S.C. section 2510
(1970) had no application in the present situation. It was, noted the court, intended to
apply only to "our Nation's communication network." 1968 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADMIN.
NEws, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2179. However, the court concluded that 18 U.S.C. section
3504 (1970) was not limited by the inapplicability of this statute, but was operative
whenever "any act - in violation of the Constitution occurs." 500 F.2d at 280.
Apart from the impropriety of extending the Constitution to protect an alien residing
in a foreign state, the court's application of this statute to the present situation appears
improper. The court acted contrary to the "accepted canon of construction that the cover-
age of a federal statute will not extend beyond our national boundaries unless such a
legislative intent clearly appears." Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n, Int'l v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 273 F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1959). See also Foley Bros. Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). Clearly,
section 3504 was intended to have application only in the United States. As the court itself
noted, its companion statute, 18 U.S.C. section 2510 (1970), was designed to operate only
in our nation's communication system. 500 F.2d at 279.
50. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
51. The pleadings, as the court noted, alleged that
Lujan, a licensed pilot, was hired in Argentina by one Duran to fly him to
Bolivia... .Duran... had been hired by American agents to lure Lujan to
Bolivia. When Lujan landed. . . on October 26, 1973, he was promptly taken
into custody by Bolivian police who were not acting at the direction of their own
superiors. . . but as paid agents of the United States. . . .Lujan. . .was held
until November 1, 1973. On that date. . . Bolivian police, acting together with
American agents, brought Lujan to the airport and placed him on a plane bound
for New York. Upon his arrival ...Lujan was formally arrested by federal
agents.
510 F.2d at 63.
CASE COMMENTS
to refrain from abductions carried out within the sovereign terri-
tory of a member state.12 The court, in Lujan, accepted this con-
struction, choosing to distinguish and limit Toscanino on a differ-
ent basis. Toscanino had alleged in the course of his offered proof
of facts that
the Uruguayan government had no prior knowledge of the kid-
napping nor did it consent thereto and had indeed condemned
this kind of apprehension as alien to its laws. 3
In Lujan, the court seized upon this assertion, otherwise ignored
in Toscanino, and concluded that appellant's pleadings in failing
to allege a similar protest were faulty. 4 Declaring that "[t]he
provisions in question are designed to protect the sovereignty of
states," the court held "it is plainly the offended states which
must in the first instance determine whether a violation of sover-
eignty occurred, or requires redress."55
This holding evidenced an awareness that Toscanino was in
need of limitation. It is, however, unfortunate that the court dis-
tinguished its decision in this manner. In so doing, the court
reaffirmed its questionable charter interpretations and again
failed to recognize the basis upon which individual rights are
accorded under international treaties.
In Toscanino, the Second Circuit concluded that the simple
violation of a treaty enabled an individual to seek redress in the
courts.55 In Lujan, the court attempted to clarify its position by
stating that a protest by the offended state was a prerequisite to
relief." Both decisions fail to realize that treaties afford individ-
ual rights only when it was the intent of the signatories that they
do so." The Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the
Organization of American States were designed to regulate the
rights and duties of nations." A state protest indicates that the
state deems itself injured by the act committed within its borders
or against its nationals." The protest is in no sense a devolution
52. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
53. 500 F.2d at 270.
54. 510 F.2d at 67.
55. Id.
56. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
57. 510 F.2d at 67.
58. See P. JESsUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 17-18 (1948); H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND Hu .N RIGHTS 27-29 (1950); W. FRIEDMAN, 0. LIsSITZYN & R. PUGH,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 217-19 (1969)(citing JEssUP and LAUTERPACHT).
59. See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
60. See 1 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 31, at 874-75.
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of rights to the individual whose claim the state may or may not
choose to espouse." The Lujan court's attempt to restrict
Toscanino resulted in an equally erroneous interpretation of law.
The effort to limit Toscanino was similarly evident in the
court's deliberations on Lujan's due process claim. The court
again assessed Lujan's pleadings in the light of Toscanino and
held that, despite the unqualified nature of its earlier decision, it
was not the court's intent "to suggest that any irregularity in the
circumstances of a defendant's arrival in the jurisdiction would
vitiate the proceedings of the criminal court."6 It was not neces-
sarily true, the court noted, that the expansion of due process
protections created irreconcilable conflicts with Ker and Frisbie.
The court belatedly recognized that the Supreme Court had never
disavowed its holdings in Ker and Frisbie, although the opportun-
ity had presented itself, and that every other court of appeals that
had passed on this question had concluded that the rule must
stand.6 3
Its intent in Toscanino, stated the court in Lujan, had been
to prohibit the acceptance of jurisdiction when the conduct
amounted to "cruel, inhuman and outrageous treatment." 4 Tos-
canino's allegations were "of a most shocking and outrageous
character. 6 5 Such acts were comparable to those condemned by
the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California" and United States
v. Russell. 7 Decisions, the Lujan court asserted, which had been
the basis of its holding in Toscanino.6 5 The government conduct
alleged by Lujan, observed the court, lacked the shocking quality
which transformed an illegal abduction, sanctioned by Ker and
Frisbie, into a violation of due process.
The court, having chosen to distinguish Toscanino by limit-
ing the circumstances in which it could be invoked, failed to
consider, once again, the underlying propriety of extending con-
stitutional protections to an alien residing in a foreign state. It is
regrettable that the court did not capitalize on the opportunity
provided by Lujan to clarify or more fully explore its holding.
61. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction), [1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No.
2 at 11-12.
62. 510 F.2d at 65.
63. Id. at 65 n.4.
64. Id. at 65.
65. Id.
66. 342 U.S. at 165.
67. 411 U.S. at 423.
68. 510 F.2d at 65.
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Indeed, the court's failure to reconsider Toscanino in its entirety
is unfortunate.
Decisions such as Toscanino and Lujan have dual import-
ance. The holdings establish a rule of law which, theoretically,
governs when similar circumstances arise. In this sense the deci-
sions must be deemed to have only partially succeeded. The hold-
ings of Toscanino were limited in Lujan to the extent that it
might fairly be argued that the decision has application only to
a unique set of facts. The Lujan decision emerged largely as a
mere restatement of the law prior to Toscanino. Despite the op-
portunity the cases provided, the court contributed little but con-
fusion and misinterpretation to international law.
Decisions, however, can have a value distinct from the prac-
tical accomplishment of providing guideposts for later courts.
The reasoning engaged in by a court, particularly when con-
fronted with international legal problems, may have a more sig-
nificant effect than its holding. In Banco Nacional De Cuba v.
Sabbatino,"9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, speaking through Judge Waterman, recognized that
[i]nternational law is derived ... from the customs and
usages of civilized nations, but its concepts are subject to gener-
ally accepted principles of morality .... Judges of municipal
courts, the bulk of whose decisions involve questions under do-
mestic law derived from a long established and increasingly
elaborate national legal system, will often find themselves un-
familiar with the ratiocination necessary for decision in this
area, where recognized precedent and accepted authority are
scant. Anyone who undertakes a search for the principles of
international law cannot help be aware of the nebulous nature
of the substance we call international law. . . . But until the
day of capable international adjudication among countries, the
municipal courts must be the custodians of the concepts of in-
ternational law, and they must expound, apply and develop that
law whenever they are called upon to do so. .... 1o
The court of appeals in Toscanino and Lujan failed to adhere to
the precepts charted in Sabbatino. Scant attention was given
basic concepts which municipal courts must appreciate in order
to grapple with common issues in international law.
The court failed to adequately explore the purposes and in-
69. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1963).
70. Id. at 860.
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tent of treaties before premising decisions upon them. This led to
probable misconstructions of relevant provisions and in turn to
the recognition of nonexistent rights. It is unlikely that the court
would have approached a relevant municipal statute in the super-
ficial manner employed to examine the charters in Toscanino and
Lujan. Similarly, little attention was devoted to determining the
validity of extending the reach of American law into a foreign
country.
The court though grounding its holdings, in part, on viola-
tions of international law neglected to explore its single most
developed source. The Second Circuit's examination of interna-
tional law focused entirely on convention. No reliance was placed
on the abductions' apparent violation of customary international
law.7 Clearly this was error, for as the Supreme Court held in The
Paquette Habana,72 international law is to be ascertained and
applied as often as questions depending upon it are presented for
adjudication.
The court failed in Toscanino and in Lujan to appreciate the
significance of international law for its holdings. Consequently,
the court failed to perform the necessary function every munici-
pal court must undertake in order to advance international law
as a system of effective jurisprudence.
Barry Carl Ross
71. See O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
LAW 279, 280 (1960).
72. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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